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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
In the principal case it was common knowledge that rocks
occasionally fell from the cliff. Because of the apparent danger,
warning signs had been erected and maintained since 1935. The
plaintiff testified that he had knowledge of the fact that rocks fell
intermittently and that he knew the situation was dangerous. From
these facts it is possible that a jury might find that a person was
himself negligent by driving an automobile into the area, or that a
person knowingly entering into a dangerous situation has assumed
the risk. It is for these reasons that the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia held the trial court in error for refusing instruc-
tions as to these defenses.
Although W. VA. CODE ch. 17, art. 10, § 17 (Michie 1961) seem-
ingly imposes absolute liability upon municipalities for disrepair
of its public streets, our appellate court has held otherwise. The
only way that the term "absolute liability" can properly be used
when referring to the court's interpretation of section seventeen is
when speaking of liability without negligence. Even when used in
this sense the term is not literally correct because before liability
will attach the city must fail to comply with the standard as set
forth in the Burdick case. This suggests that the court might re-
frain from the use of the term completely. Nevertheless the de-
cisions are sound. Few can doubt the inherently undesirable con-
sequences which would result if the appellate court did not care-
fully govern the application of the statute. The cost of maintaining
public streets would be extravagant if the statute were construed
otherwise.
Charles Ellsworth Heilmann
Property-Cancellation of Note at Payee's Death
Not Testamentary Gift
A note was given as part payment for the purchase of a restaurant.
The note contained a condition which specified that if the payee,
who was the maker's partner in operating the restaurant, prede-
ceased the maker while the note was unpaid, the outstanding bal-
ance would be considered paid and cancelled. Suits by residuary
legatees of the payee on the note were dismissed by the lower
court. Held, dismissal affirmed. The court found that no liability
existed on the note following the death of the maker. Since the
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condition was contractual and not testamentary in character, this
was not an invalid attempt to make a testamentary disposition. The
formalities of the Statute of Wills had no application. Nunally v.
Wilder, 330 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
This case raises the question of how far the courts will allow a
person to go in making a gift of property without incorporating the
gift in a will. The principal case seems to be indicative of the
tendency of some courts to avoid the proposition that an attempted
gift is testamentary and void. By construing the condition in the note
as contractual, the court was able to say that the Statute of Wills
was inapplicable. Whether the result would have been the same
if the maker and payee had not been business partners or whether
other courts would have disregarded the Statute of Wills is ques-
tionable. However, at least one case has been found where another
court's holding was analagous on a similar set of facts. In re Estate
of Lewis, 2 Wash. 2d 458, 98 P.2d 654 (1940). In that case a de-
cedent, during his lifetime, conveyed land to his son, taking back
a purchase money mortgage. The mortgage provided that any
amount due on the mortgage at the time of the mortgagee's death
should be cancelled and considered paid by his executors. The
court held that the provision in the mortgage was not an invalid
testamentary disposition but a binding contract between the mort-
gagor and mortgagee.
There is authority that the outcome in the instant case would
have been different had the court looked at the transaction as a
gift subject to a condition precedent rather than a contract. Kimmey
v. Kimmey, 273 App. Div. 142, 77 N.Y.S.2d 374 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
In the Kimmey case the payee of certain notes delivered them to the
maker, telling him that the notes should be considered a gift in
the event the payee's wife should predecease the payee. The court
found that the transaction did not establish a valid gift inter vivos
even though the payee's wife predeceased him, because there was
no intent to make a present gift.
There are several analagous situations which are in the nature of
testamentary dispositions and which illustrate the extent to which
a person may go in disposing of property without having to comply
with the statutes governing wills. The question frequently arises
where gifts of real or personal property are contemplated, particu-
larly where the subject matter involves savings accounts. In addi-
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tion, the "Totten trust" doctrine, which has been adopted by several
jurisdictions, has been attacked as an attempted testamentary dis-
position.
The common law inter vivos gift has four strict requirements:
present donative intent, delivery, relinquishment of dominion by
the donor and acceptance by the donee. Beaver v. Beaver, 117
N.Y. 421, 22 N.E. 940, 6 N.Y. Supp. 586 (1889). Unless the alleged
donee takes a present interest in the subject matter, the gift is
unenforceable. BROwN, PERsoNAL PoPERT § 48 (2d ed. 1956).
However, the rule that a gift to take effect in the future is void
can be avoided by finding a present gift of the right to the subject
matter, with only the enjoyment postponed to the future.
In the leading case of Innes v. Potter, 130 Minn. 320, 153 N.W.
604 (1915), the donor delivered certain shares of stock to a third
person with directions to deliver them to the donee on the death
of the donor. The court held that even though the instrument post-
poned enjoyment of the subject matter until after the death of the
grantor, it was not necessarily testamentary in character. The test
was held to depend upon the intent of the maker. If the maker
intends that the instrument have no effect until after his death, the
transaction is testamentary and void; but if the intent is to transfer
some present interest, the instrument is not a will and is irrevocable.
The effect of such an interpretation is to reserve a life estate in
the donor without invalidating the donation. A significant number
of jurisdictions are in accord with the Innes case. Scrivens v. North
Easton Say. Bank, 166 Mass. 255, 44 N.E. 251 (1896); Howard v.
Hobles, 125 Md. 639, 94 At. 318 (1915); Payne v. Tobacco Trading
Corp., 179 Va. 156, 18 S.E.2d 281 (1942)
The West Virginia Supreme Court has applied a similar rule in
regard to real property transactions. In Lauck v. Logan, 45 W. Va.
251, 31 S.E. 986 (1898), the grantors delivered a deed to the
grantee, stipulating that the deed would be in full force and effect
immediately after the death of the grantor and no sooner. The
court found that this was a valid deed and not a testamentary
paper. The grantee, in effect, received a vested remainder which
was to ripen into enjoyment on the death of the grantor. The court
stated that neither the belief of the maker as to the character of
the instrument nor the type of language employed was necessarily
controlling. In the final analysis the intention of the grantor was
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held to be decisive, and this had to be ascertained from all the
surrounding circumstances. In another West Virginia case, a father
granted a tract of land to his daughter, specifying that the deed was
not to take effect until after his death, even though the grantee was
allowed to make improvements on the land. The court found that
an interest passed to the daughter, subject to a life estate in the
father. Rust v. Commercial Coal & Coke Co., 92 W. Va. 457, 115
S.E. 406 (1922).
More recently the West Virginia Supreme Court has held that the
rule of the Lauck and Rust cases was binding. Ligett v. Rohr, 122
W. Va. 166, 7 S.E.2d 867 (1948). In that case the grantor deeded
a certain tract of land to her children, providing that the deed was
not to take effect until the death of the grantor. The majority of
the court ruled that the deed created an immediate estate in the
grantee which would come into full enjoyment when the grantor
died. Judge Kenna, in a dissenting opinion, stated that the con-
veyance was an attempted testamentary disposition and that it was
apparent from the language used in the conveyance that the grantor
did not intend for anything to vest in the grantee when the deed
was executed and delivered. Thus, the deed was not good as a will
and therefore of no effect.
Joint bank accounts are a common device used by persons in an
attempt to arrange their property in such a manner that title to their
property will pass automatically upon the death of the owner with
no need for an administration of his estate. Typically, an account is
opened in the name of the depositor and another as co-depositor,
or perhaps the account was originally opened as an individual
account and is subsequently changed into a joint account. Because
the money deposited is owned at the time of the deposit by the
depositor, the question is what effect does the deposit in the joint
account have on the title to the funds.
Many courts have considered the transaction as testamentary in
nature and governed by the law of wills, Bachmann v. Reardon, 138
Conn. 665, 88 A.2d 391 (1952), while others have classified it as
involving the law of gifts. Johnson v. Savings Inv. & Trust Co.,
107 N.J. Eq. 547, 153 At. 382 (1931). Comparison of two cases in
this area reveals how the courts can reach different results on sub-
stantially the same set of facts. In Tygard v. McComb, 54 Mo. App.
85 (1893), a father deposited certain sums in a savings bank to the
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credit of his minor daughters, retaining the passbook in his pos-
session. During his life he treated the account as his own, and
there was evidence that he wanted his daughters to have the money
in the event of his death. The court held that since the money
deposited was subject to the father's control and was not intended
to vest in the children until his death, it was merely an attempted
testamentary disposition. In Malone v. Walsh, 315 Mass. 484, 53
N.E.2d 126 (1944), the decendent, during her lifetime, made three
joint deposits in her name and that of her brother. The decedent
retained possession of the bank books at all times and made with-
drawals for her own purposes, but none were made by her brother.
The court held that the deposits had vested a present interest in
decedent's brother as a joint tenant which would ripen into com-
plete ownership and enjoyment in the event the decendent prede-
ceased him.
Many states have sustained the joint account as a valid gift by
modifying or abandoning some of the traditional common law re-
quirements as expressed in Beaver v. Beaver, supra. In several jur-
isdictions delivery of the passbook has been held to be unnecessary
on the theory that if either account holder may have the book, then
both cannot, and the donor's retention of it does not defeat the gift.
Commercial Trust Co. v. White, 99 N.J. Eq. 119, 132 Atl. 761
(1926). It also has been held that the donor's retention of the right
to withdraw the deposit does not defeat the gift because the donee
has the same right. Burns v. Nolette, 83 N.H. 489, 144 Ad. 848
(1929). In addition, a few courts have found intent to make a
gift unnecessary. Bark v. Mulich, 83 Colo. 518, 266 Pac. 1110
(1928); Beach v. Holland, 172 Ore. 396, 142 P.2d 990 (1943).
A number of states avoid the gift theory by considering the trans-
action as a contract between the depositor, the bank and the
co-depositor, creating rights enforceable by the co-depositor. In
re Estate of Mclllrath, 276 II. App. 408 (1934); Chadrow v. Kell-
man, 378 Pa. 237, 106 A.2d 594 (1954) (dissenting opinion); Jones,
The Use of Joint Bank Accounts as a Substitute for Testamentary
Dispositions of Property, 17 U. Prrr. L. REv. 42 (1955). If the
transaction is considered a contract, it then becomes presently
operative. This negates the possibility of having the transaction
attacked as testamentary in nature, and there are no requirements
of acceptance and delivery as in the law of gifts. The enforcement
of the co-depositor's right involves no violation of the Statute of
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Wills, because the Statute is inapplicable to contracts. Castle v.
Wightmar, 303 Mass. 74, 20 N.E.2d 436 (1939). The Virginia court
took a slightly different approach in regard to the joint account
transaction. Deals Adm'r v. Merchants & Mechanics' Bank, 120 Va.
297, 91 S.E. 135 (1917). In that case a decedent, during her life-
time, deposited money in the bank to the joint account of herself
and her sister. It was held that the deposits created the relation
of debtor and creditor between the bank and the depositors, and
when the decedent died, the balance of the account belonged to the
sister.
In several jurisdictions the courts are able to rely on joint tenancy
statutes designed to deal with joint bank accounts. The New York
court, in interpreting its joint tenancy statute, has developed the
following rule: As to money left in the account at the death of
the depositor, there is a conclusive presumption that a joint tenancy
was intended; but as to funds withdrawn prior to the death of the
depositor, the presumption is rebuttable. Such a withdrawal does
not destroy the tenancy; instead, it only "opens the door" to compe-
tent testimony that would show that no joint tenancy was intended
to be created. Bricker v. Krimer, 13 N.Y.2d 22, 191 N.E.2d 795, 241
N.Y.S.2d 413 (1963). The New York statute is practically identical
to the West Virginia joint tenancy statute which provides:
"fWhen a deposit is made by any person in the name of such
depositor and another person and in form to be paid to either,
or the survivor of them, such deposit, and any addition thereto
made, by either such persons, upon making thereof, shall become
the property of such persons as joint tenants.. . ." W. VA. CoDE
ch. 31, art. 8, § 23 (Michie 1961).
While the purpose for the enactment of the West Virginia statute
was to protect bank institutions, it has been held to create property
rights in the depositors. Lett v. Twentieth St. Bank, 138 W. Va.
759, 77 S.E.2d 813 (1953); 66 W. VA. L. BEv. 252 (1964).
A similar problem is also encountered in the area of trusts. If
an intended trust is revocable throughout the lifetime of the de-
positor, the question arises whether it is a testamentary trust and
invalid under the Statute of Wills. In the leading case of In re
Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904), it was held that a deposit
of money by the owner in his own name as trustee for another does
not necessarily establish an irrevocable trust during the lifetime of
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the depositor. Such a deposit was held to be "tentative trust",
revocable at the will of the depositor. In the event the depositor
dies before the beneficiary without having revoked the trust, the
presumption arises that an absolute trust was created as to the
balance on hand at the death of the depositor. This "Totten trust"
doctrine has been adopted elsewhere. Bollack v. Bollack, 169 Md.
407, 182 Atl. 317 (1936); Walso v. Latterner, 140 Minn. 455, 168
N.W. 353 (1918); In re Estate of Scanlon, 313 Pa. 424, 169 At. 106
(1933); RESTATENmT, TRusTs § 65 (1930). Although not having
adopted the rule, California seems favorable to it. Kuck v. Raftery,
117 Cal. App. 755, 4 P.2d 552 (1931). The New Jersey court, how-
ever, has held that such an interpretation of the deposit would
render it testamentary and void. Nicklas v. Parker, 69 N.J. Eq.
743, 61 Adt. 267 (1905).
If the courts which approve the "Totten trust" doctrine intend to
imply that no trust arises until the death of the depositor, it would
appear that the trust is testamentary, since the deposior's death is a
condition precedent to the creation of the trust. On the other hand,
it would seem more reasonable to assume that a trust is created at
the time of deposit, even though it remains revocable in whole or
in part by the depositor. Even so, it is hard to escape the fact that
the depositor has complete control over the deposit, and that the
trust in substance appears to be testamentary. If the subject of
the trust were property other than a savings account in the bank, the
trust clearly would be testamentary. Scott, Trusts and the Statute
of Wills, 43 HIRv. L. REv. 521 (1930). However, such a device
offers a convenient method of disposing of relatively small amounts
of money without having to resort to probate proceedings; thus,
there seems to be no strong policy against the creation of these
trusts.
It seems evident that the courts are becoming more liberal in sus-
taining transactions which are apparently testamentary and void.
In reaching the desired result the courts have employed a variety
of theories, ranging from the law of gifts to the law of contracts.
The principal case appears to provide another example of the
tendency to uphold such transactions.
Ralph Judy Bean, Jr.
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